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FUNDING OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION PLANS: 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR? 
 
ISRAEL GOLDOWITZ1 
 
*** 
Public pensions can be poorly funded, and, if recent events are any 
guide, benefit promises may be impaired in municipal bankruptcies.  
Experience with private-sector pension plans suggests that responsible 
funding is the best protection against default risk.  
Studebaker’s default on promised pensions inspired the 1974 federal 
pension reform act, ERISA.  The company’s pension plan was substantially 
underfunded when the company failed, despite periodic contributions under 
pre-ERISA standards.  The plan’s assets first paid retirees’ benefits, leaving 
7,000 younger workers with little to nothing in retirement.  ERISA addressed 
this default risk through funding rules and PBGC insurance. 
ERISA’s minimum funding rules have not prevented pension plan 
failure.  To the contrary, the PBGC and plan participants have absorbed 
some large losses.  However, the funding rules remain the primary 
protection against default risk.   
                                                                                                                                      
1 Chief Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (“PBGC”), Adjunct Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center (“GULC”). Views expressed do not reflect the 
views of PBGC, GULC, or any other organization.  
I thank Amy Monahan, Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, 
for the opportunity to present this concept at the American Law Institute’s 2015 
conference, The Law and Public Pensions, and Brendan Maher, Professor at the 
University of Connecticut Law School, for the opportunity to present at the Fifth 
Annual National Benefits & Social Insurance Conference in 2016. Professor 
Monahan’s work is an important starting point for anyone who wants to understand 
the issues that affect public pensions. E.g., Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal 
Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV., 
117 (2015); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy B. Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good 
Governance? State Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance 
to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317 (2014). Natalya Shnitser, Assistant 
Professor at Boston College Law School, has done important empirical work in this 
area. Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An 
Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663 (2015).  
I thank Sam Alberts, James Armbruster, Christopher Bone, Julie Cameron, 
Charles Finke, Amy Monahan, Kathryn Moore, James O’Neill, Bruce Perlin, 
Lawrence Rausch, Sanford Rich, Natalya Shnitser, John Turner, and Andrea Wong 
for their critical reading and helpful comments, and Michelle Li for her assistance 
with citations. Any errors are mine.   
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Among the strengths of ERISA’s funding rules are mandatory 
amortization of unfunded liabilities, constraints on actuarial methods and 
assumptions, a variety of enforcement tools, and payment restrictions for 
poorly funded plans.  ERISA also has robust reporting and disclosure 
requirements, which can help promote funding discipline.   
Congress has amended ERISA’s funding rules many times since 
1974, as it addresses competing social and federal revenue-raising goals.  
Though generally sound, some changes have been ill-timed or made for the 
wrong reasons.     
This article’s thesis is that the experience under ERISA, both 
positive and negative, has important lessons for public plans.  The article 
first provides a brief history of legal developments up to ERISA’s enactment.  
It then describes ERISA’s minimum standards, which include vesting and 
benefit accrual rules, funding standards, fiduciary standards, reporting and 
disclosure, and benefit insurance, but which generally do not apply to public 
plans.  It then surveys ERISA’s funding rules for both single-employer and 
multiemployer plans, and provides a history of those rules, showing how 
Congress has generally tightened the rules, though it has sometimes relaxed 
them.  Next, it surveys other controls on funding, such as reporting and 
disclosure, accounting rules, and actuarial standards. Finally, it sets forth 
conclusions that may be of use to law reformers, among them the need for 
funding rules, conservative actuarial assumptions, actuarial independence, 
enforcement tools, transparency, and a balance between funding and benefit 
promises. 
*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In my tenure with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(“PBGC”), I have often seen pension plans fail that might have survived if 
funding rules had been stronger.  Among them are plans in the steel and 
airline industries that were underfunded by billions of dollars.2   
                                                                                                                                      
2  PBGC is the federal agency charged with insuring private-sector defined 
benefit pension plans. 29 U.S.C. §1302 (2012). PBGC was established by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001-1461. In 
carrying out its statutory mission, PBGC devotes much of its day-to-day attention to 
financially troubled sponsors of underfunded plans. For an overview, see Israel 
Goldowitz, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, & Kirsten Bender, The PBGC Wins a Case 
Whenever the Debtor Keeps Its Pension Plan, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE 
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Corporate sponsors of PBGC-insured defined benefit plans have 
struggled with a number of adverse trends.  Among them globalization of 
manufacturing and trade, industry obsolescence, and volatility in financial 
markets, and pension cost increases due to improvements in life expectancy.  
The decline in private sector unionization and the growth in defined 
contribution plans have also contributed to the steady decline in private 
defined benefit plans.  As a result, fewer workers in the defined benefit 
system are supporting more retirees for longer periods.  That puts an 
increasing burden on labor costs and, in turn, the cost of goods and services.  
The same pay package supports retiree healthcare in many cases.3     
Some of these trends affect defined benefit pension plans for state 
and local employees.  So the private-sector experience may be useful to those 
considering funding rules for public plans.  
Public plans cover about 15 million employees and 10 million 
retirees and surviving dependents.  Based on reported data and plan-specific 
actuarial assumptions, public plans are underfunded by more than $1 trillion.  
They are 73% funded on average, and plans in Illinois, Connecticut and 
Kentucky less than 50% funded.  The unfunded liabilities represent an 
average taxpayer burden of about $3,000 per capita, with Illinois, 
Connecticut, and Ohio at about $7,000.4 
                                                                                                                                      
L. REV. 257 (2015), http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1005&context=benefits. 
3  For another synthesis, see Ilana Boivie, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., Who Killed 
the Private Sector DB Plan? (March 2011), http://www.nirsonline.org/ 
storage/nirs/documents/Who%20Killed%20DBs%20final-
_who_killed_the_private_sector_db_plan.pdf.   
4 Alaska leads the nation at $11,000 per capita and Puerto Rico is close behind 
at $10,000. Keith Brainard & Alex Brown, NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE RET. ADMIN., 
Public Fund Survey (“NASRA Survey”) and id., APPENDIX B (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.nasra.org/publicfundsurvey; Standard and Poor, Ratings Direct, U.S. 
State Pension Funding: Strong Investment Returns Could Life Funded Rations, But 
Longer-Term Challenges Remain (Jun. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Credit%20Effects/sandpstate1406.
pdf. Data are as of 2014. For accounting and funding purposes, future benefits are 
discounted to present value. The higher the assumed interest rate, the lower the 
present value. Dan M. McGill, Kyle N. Brown, John J. Haley, Sylvester J. Schieber 
& Mark J. Warshawsky, Fundamentals of Private Pensions 207-09 (9th ed. 2010). 
The NASRA Survey notes: “Even a small change in a plan’s investment return 
assumption can impose a disproportionate impact on a plan’s funding level and cost. 
For most of the Public Fund Survey’s measurement period, the median investment 
return assumption used by public pension plans was 8.0 percent. Since 2009, a 
majority of plans have reduced their assumed investment return, resulting in a 
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In the past decade, pension obligations have been a factor in several 
municipal bankruptcies.  Central Falls, Rhode Island, for example, 
negotiated a benefit reduction that in some cases exceeded 40%.5  Detroit 
negotiated a 4.5% benefit reduction, along with other benefit concessions, to 
resolve litigation with bondholders and present a viable plan of adjustment 
of its debts.6  Like many jurisdictions, Detroit had used aggressive interest 
rate assumptions to value benefit liabilities, masking the problem.  Detroit 
had also depleted plan assets by paying a “13th check” during flush times and 
overstating the earnings transferred to commonly managed annuity 
accounts.7  Stockton, California, sought to withdraw from the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), but eventually decided 
against it.8   
                                                                                                                                      
reduction to the median return assumption to 7.75 percent.” Id., Figure N. “Asset 
smoothing,” i.e., averaging of returns, can also have a significant effect. See Mary 
Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, New York Gets Sobering Look at Its Pensions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/ 
20/nyregion/20pension.html.   
5  Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhode-island-
could-set-a-trend.html.  W. Zachary Malinowski, Chafee Signs Law Giving Retired 
Central Falls Police, Firefighters Pension Supplement, PROVIDENCE J. (Aug, 27, 
2014), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140827/News/308279896 
(noting that the state later enacted legislation to restore up to 75% of the original 
amounts). 
6   Susan Tompor, Detroit Retirees to See Pension Cuts Starting Monday, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-
finance/susan-tompor/2015/02/27/detroit-orr-pension-checks-cuts/24144513.  
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Internal Revenue Manual, § 7.11.6.6.11 (Sept. 18, 
2015), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-011-006.html (noting in the private 
sector, if a plan “is amended on a regular basis to provide for thirteenth checks…, 
the series of amendments may give rise to an expectation of such payments and be 
subject to protection as an accrued benefit…”). 
7  NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND BACK 52-
57, 157-61 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2016). 
8  Marc Lifsher and Melody Peterson, Judge Approves Stockton Bankruptcy 
Plan; Worker Pensions Safe, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-stockton-pension-court-ruling-cuts-20141029-story.html;  In re City 
of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (city authorized to 
reject its contract with CalPERS and to avoid a statutory “termination lien” for 
pension underfunding under the Bankruptcy Code, which preempts contrary state 
law); Id. (noting CalPERS is apparently an “agent” rather than “cost-sharing 
multiple-employer plan,” with common administration of separate plans for 
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Outside bankruptcy, courts are generally more protective of public 
employees’ pension benefits. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court 
recently held that Chicago cannot reduce cost-of-living adjustments despite 
requiring increased contributions and providing administrative and judicial 
remedies, thereby putting pensions on a sounder financial footing for a 
greater “net benefit.”  “[M]embers of the Funds already have a legally 
enforceable right to receive the benefits they have been promised” under the 
State Constitution, the Court held.  “By offering a purported ‘offsetting 
benefit’ of actuarially sound funding and solvency in the Funds, the 
legislation merely offers participants in those funds what is already 
guaranteed to them—payment of the pension benefits in place when they 
joined the fund.”9   
Pension funding issues, of course, exist in a larger context of budget 
politics.10  To avoid statutory borrowing limits, Detroit set up remote entities 
to finance pension debt, collateralized the debt with casino tax revenues, and 
tacked on default insurance and interest-rate swaps.11  The Chicago “net 
benefit” proposal was designed to avoid a property tax increase.12  New 
Jersey’s governor declined to follow a law that required inclusion of an 
                                                                                                                                      
participating employers rather than a single risk pool); see Shnitser, supra note 1, at 
688-89. 
9  Jones v. Mun. Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 50 N.E.3d 
596, 607 (Ill. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 
10 See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, Full Report (2012), 
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org.  For an influential report focused on public 
pensions, see Donald J. Boyd & Pieter J. Kiernan, Strengthening the Security of 
Public Sector Defined Benefit Plans, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV'T 
(St. U. of N.Y. ed., 2014), http://www.rockinst.org/ pdf/government_finance/2014-
01-Blinken_Report_One.pdf. 
11  The arrangement was undone in a bankruptcy settlement.  Bomey, supra note 
7, at 23-30, 92-112. 
12  Monica Davey and Mary Williams Walsh, Pensions and Politics Fuel Crisis 
in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/05/26/us/politics/illinois-pension-crisis.html. Chicago continues to struggle, 
with a new valuation more than doubling the shortfall of its Municipal Employees’ 
Annuity and Benefit Fund, Elizabeth Campbell, Chicago’s Pension-Fund Woes Just 
Became $11.5 Billion Bigger, BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-19/chicago-s-pension-fund-
troubles-just-became-11-5-billion-bigger, and the legislature overriding a veto of a 
funding relief bill for the uniformed services plan. Elizabeth Campbell, Illinois 
Lawmakers Override Veto of Chicago Pension Break, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-30/illinois-senate-moves-to-
override-veto-of-chicago-pension-break. 
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actuarially determined “minimum required contribution” as a line item in 
annual appropriation acts and conferred a contract right on plan members to 
that contribution.  The State Supreme Court agreed—“The Debt Limitation 
Clause of the State Constitution interdicts the creation . . . of a legally binding 
enforceable contract compelling multi-year financial payments in the sizable 
amounts” at issue.13  
Cities have sold or pledged assets to fund pension costs.  Detroit’s 
“grand bargain” included a purchase of the Detroit Institute of Art’s 
collection by national and local charitable foundations.14  Chicago and other 
cities have pledged future parking meter revenues. 15   And Scranton, 
Pennsylvania, recently monetized its sewer system in part to pay down its 
pension shortfall.16   
Pensions, in short, represent a major challenge for state and 
municipal finance.17  The concern extends to U.S. territories.  In June 2016, 
Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
                                                                                                                                      
13  Burgos v. State of New Jersey, 118 A.3d 270, 274-75 (N.J. 2015).  Later, 
condemning “accounting gimmickry,” the governor vetoed a bill calling for 
quarterly and supplemental pension contributions.  Christopher Baxter, Christie 
Vetoes Quarterly N.J. Pension Payments Bill, $300M 'Pre-payment', NJ.COM (Aug. 
10, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/08/christie_vetoes_quartely_ 
nj_pension_payments_bill.html. 
14  Jordan Weissman, Detroit Exits Bankruptcy, Thanks to Its Art Museum , 
SLATE (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/11/07/ 
detroit_exits_bankruptcy_city_s_pensions_saved_in_part_thanks_to_detroit.html.  
Some doubt that this could be a template for other cities.  Michael J. Bologna, Would 
Detroit’s ‘Grand Bargain’ Work in Chicago?, BLOOMBERGBNA (May 6, 2016), 
http://www.bna.com/detroits-grand-bargain-n57982070754/. The bargain was 
upheld under the doctrine of equitable mootness—which prevents appellate courts 
from “unscrambling complex bankruptcy reorganizations.” Ochadleus v City of 
Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792 (6th Cir, 2016) (citations omitted). 
15  Donald Cohen, Cities Need to Weigh Costs of Private Partnerships, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Jul. 23, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/cities-need-to-
weigh-costs-of-private-partnerships/. 
16   Terrie Morgan-Besecker, Sewer Sale Could Save Scranton Pensions, 
SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/sewer-
sale-could-save-scranton-pensions-1.1981682. 
17  See generally, James E. Spiotto, How Municipalities in Financial Distress 
Should Deal with Unfunded Pension Obligations and Appropriate Funding of 
Essential Services, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 515 (2014); Alicia H. Munnell & Jean-
Pierre Aubry, Will Pensions and OPEBs Break State and Local Budgets?, CTR. FOR 
RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Oct. 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/slp_51-1.pdf.    
2016 FUNDING OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION PLANS 149 
 
Stability Act (“PROMESA”), establishing an Oversight Board to restructure 
the island’s $72 billion in debt and balance its budget.  PROMESA requires 
an actuarial study of territorial pensions, but not a compromise of pensions 
as part of a restructuring plan.18  Even the pension plan for Marianas Island 
employees briefly found shelter in bankruptcy until the case was dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds.19  
To be sure, many public plans are reasonably well funded, at least 
under stated assumptions.20  In some cases, they survived a larger financial 
crisis.  In 1976, New York State imposed a Financial Control Board with a 
majority of members appointed by the Governor as a condition of rescuing 
New York City’s finances.21  The Board remains in place and retains certain 
                                                                                                                                      
 18  Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, S. 2328, 
114th Cong. § 211 (2016) (noting PROMESA authorizes the Oversight Board to 
conduct an actuarial analysis of any underfunded territorial pension plan to aid “in 
evaluating the fiscal and economic impact of the pension cash flows…  [such an 
analysis would include] (1) an actuarial study of the pension liabilities and funding 
strategy that includes a forward looking projection of payments of at least 30 years 
of benefit payments and funding strategy to cover such payments; (2) sources of 
funding to cover such payments; (3) a review of the existing benefits and their 
sustainability; and (4) a review of the system’s legal structure and operational 
arrangements, and any other studies of the pension system the Oversight Board shall 
deem necessary.”)  Peter Roff, A Bad Bailout for Puerto Rico, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (May 26, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/ 
2016-05-26/house-bill-promesa-that-grants-bailout-to-puerto-rico-rips-off-
bondholders (“Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds . . . would [] take a back seat 
to Puerto Rico's almost totally underfunded $46 billion public pension system”).    
Puerto Rico’s pension system is described in Nick Brown, Puerto Rico’s Other 
Crisis: Impoverished Pensions, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/ 
investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-pensions.  A recent audit indicates that 
Puerto Rico’s Employees’ Retirement System, with a reported $30 billion in 
liabilities, will run out of money within a year.  Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Pension 
Risks Insolvency Next Year, Audit Says, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 3, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/puerto-rico-pension-plan-
risks-insolvency-next-year-audit-says. 
19  Caitlin Kenney, Judge Says Pension Fund Can't Seek Bankruptcy Protection, 
NPR (Jun. 5, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/05/154302347/ 
judge-says-pension-fund-cant-seek-bankruptcy-protection. 
20 Brainard & Brown, supra note 4.   
21 CONG. BUDGET OFF., The Causes of New York City’s Fiscal Crisis 1975, 90 
POL. SCI. Q. 659 (Winter 1975-76); Roger Dunstan, CAL. RES. BUREAU, CAL. STATE 
LIBR., Overview of New York City’s Fiscal Crisis (1995), 
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/95/notes/v3n1.pdf. As part of the compromise, the 
City teachers’ pension fund bought bonds of the Municipal Assistance Corporation, 
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oversight duties.22   New York City’s pensions have respectable funding 
ratios, though hardly strong ones.23  As part of the federal rescue of the 
District of Columbia’ finances in 1997, Congress had the federal government 
takeover $4.8 billion in unfunded pension liability for DC police, 
firefighters, teachers, and judges; froze the plans; adopted an amortization 
schedule; and authorized replacement plans.  The new plans were required 
to be funded under standards borrowed from ERISA as then in effect. These 
plans have strong funding ratios.24   
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL PENSION LAW 
ERISA governs private-sector employee benefit plans.25   ERISA 
sets minimum standards for participation, vesting, benefit accrual, funding, 
fiduciary conduct, and reporting and disclosure.  ERISA also established 
PBGC to insure benefits under failed defined benefit plans.26   
                                                                                                                                      
which was formed to provide the City with emergency financing. Eric Jaffe, 
CITYLAB, The Time the Teachers' Union Saved New York from Bankruptcy (July 24, 
2013), http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/07/time-teachers-union-save-new-york-
city-bankruptcy/6306.  
22 STATE OF N.Y., FIN. CONTROL BD., MISSION STATEMENT, 
http://www.fcb.state.ny.us (“During sunset, the Control Board must review the four-
year financial plan at least quarterly, and must notify the City if a plan or 
modification to the financial plan does not conform to the Act's standards.  In 
addition, the Control Board must make a determination annually whether a new 
control period . . . should be declared”). 
23  New York City’s two largest pension plans have funding ratios of 58% and 
70%.  The statewide plans have ratios greater than 90 percent.  NASRA, PUBLIC 
FUND SURVEY, APPENDIX B, supra note 4.  The State’s budget process can obscure 
the facts, however, and pension funding is no exception.  RICHARD RAVITCH, SO 
MUCH TO DO: A FULL LIFE OF BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND CONFRONTING FISCAL 
CRISES 215-16 (2014) (contribution of promissory notes under the guise of “pension 
smoothing”).    
24  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§11001-11087, 111 Stat. 
251, 715-31 (1997).  See EDWIN C. HUSTEAD, PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 354-
362 (Olivia S. Mitchell and Edwin C. Hustead, eds. 2001).  Those plans now have 
89-percent and 107-percent funding ratios.  NASRA, supra note 4. 
25  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (2014).  ERISA exempts governmental plans. 26 
U.S.C. § 414(d) (2015); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1) (2002), 1321(b)(2) (2008).    
26  29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453. A defined benefit plan is one that promises a benefit 
based on a formula, typically a percentage of final pay times years of service. 29 
USC § 1002(35) (2008).  Because the benefit is due regardless of the plan’s funding 
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The House Ways and Means Committee, one of the committees of 
jurisdiction, saw responsible funding as the main protection for vested 
benefits under such plans— “Without adequate funding, a promise of a 
pension may be illusory and empty.”  Moreover, “[t]o create a plan 
termination insurance program without appropriate funding standards would 
permit those who present the greatest risk in terms of exposure to benefit at 
the expense of employers who have developed conscientious funding 
programs.”27   
A. HISTORY OF PENSION REGULATION 
Pensions were originally a workforce management tool.28  A trained 
workforce is a valuable asset.  But pay increases as worker’s advance, and 
workers wear out as they age, especially in industrial jobs.  So at some point, 
it makes sense to replace older workers.  By giving older workers an 
incentive to retire and new hires an incentive to stay, pensions help to 
manage turnover.   
The first pensions were for the military.  Private pensions were first 
introduced by steel companies, railroads, and public utilities in the late 19th 
Century.  Pensions for federal civilian employees and state and local 
employees are mainly a 20th Century development.29   
State courts initially saw pensions as gratuities, and unenforceable.30  
A few courts saw a pension promise as an offer of a unilateral contract—
promise for performance—to a class of persons.  For example, if an employer 
promises anyone who works 20 years and reaches age 65 a pension of one-
                                                                                                                                      
status, investment risk is on the employer. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 
525 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1999). 
27  H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 at 7, 14 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 
4645, 4652. 
28  LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION 
AND WELFARE BENEFITS 7 (3d ed. 2012) (citing MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE 
FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10 (1964)). 
29  ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG, & JACK W. WILSON, PENSION RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (U. Penn. 
Press ed. 2003), http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org/publications/pdf/0-8122-
3714-5-1.pdf; JEFFREY LEWIS, MYRON D. RUMELT, & IVELISSE BERIO LEBEAU, 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 1-1 (3d ed. 2012); David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA 
Preemption of State Law: A Study of Effective Federalism,  
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 438 (1987). 
30  E.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898), 
aff’d per curiam, 60 N.E. 1115 (N.Y. 1901), cited in Gregory, supra note 29.   
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third of her final pay for life, any member of the class who meets these 
conditions would have a contractual right to a pension.31   
A worker rights theory mainly emerged in other forums.  For 
example, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) developed a theory of vesting 
in plan assets when a plan terminates (or when a major downsizing can be 
considered a termination for affected employees).32  The IRS administers the 
rules that allow pension plans to be tax-qualified.  Employer contributions to 
a qualified plan are tax deductible, the plan’s earnings are not taxed, and 
employees are taxed only on their distributions. 33  No employer wants its 
plan to be disqualified, given the substantial tax benefits at stake. 
The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (“LMRA”), altered the 
balance of power between management and labor, and included pension 
provisions.  Some unions had negotiated pension and health benefit plans 
funded by employers.  Congress required that the money be held in trust, that 
contributions be governed by a written agreement, and that the trust be 
administered by equal numbers of employer and union appointees.34  In light 
of these requirements, some courts held that if the trustees changed the 
eligibility rules and did so arbitrarily, they could be compelled to honor the 
prior rules.35   
                                                                                                                                      
31  See Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co., 240 N.E. 2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) 
(early retirement offer), cited in 1-3 Corbin on Contracts § 3.16 (2006). An example 
well-known to lawyers is Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, 1 QB 256 (1893). 
A vendor put an ad in a newspaper saying that anyone who bought this contraption 
and inhaled its vapors and still contracted the flu would be paid 100 pounds. The 
court held that this was an offer to a class and that any member of the class who met 
the conditions had accepted the offer and held an enforceable right to payment. 
32  Isidore Goodman, Developing Pension and Profit-Sharing Requisites, 13 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1972). See In re Gulf Pension Litig., 764 F. Supp. 
1149 (S.D. Tex. 1991).  See also Lewis, supra note 29, at 1-5 (Tax Code’s “exclusive 
benefit” rule was designed to curb deductions for amounts subject to recapture by 
revocation of pension trust, but also to encourage formation of trusts on which 
employees can rely for retirement income); 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(3) (2014).   
33  29 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a), 501(a).   
34  As trustees, those appointees serve as fiduciaries, not collective bargaining 
representatives.  NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981). 
35  See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“[the] authorities 
are divided as to whether an applicant for a pension has a contractual interest in the 
Fund as a third party beneficiary to the Wage Agreement, or whether his interest is 
merely equitable and conditioned on meeting the eligibility requirements reasonably 
established by the Trustees. Since our view of the present case does not require a 
determination of this controversy, we express no opinion on it.”). 
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In 1948, the National Labor Relations Board held that pensions are 
among the terms and conditions of employment, and, as such, a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining.36  In 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare 
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,37 which required all employee benefit 
plans to file an annual report with the Department of Labor.  But there was 
no comprehensive federal law until ERISA.   
B. ERISA’S MINIMUM STANDARDS 
ERISA’s minimum standards codify an understanding that pensions 
are deferred compensation for services rendered.38  Among its key features, 
ERISA: 
 requires that employees be allowed to participate in a plan after 
a minimal length of service; 
 requires that benefits vest within a reasonable period, so 
employees do not forfeit their rights if they go to work 
elsewhere, become disabled, or retire early;   
 requires that a surviving spouse receive a benefit, to protect non-
working spouses;   
 provides that accrued benefits generally cannot be reduced;   
 requires that defined benefit plans be advance funded; 
 imposes minimum standards of prudence and loyalty on plan 
fiduciaries, and prohibits self-dealing; 
 requires annual financial reporting, and plain-English disclosure 
of plan terms;  
 provides for federal insurance of defined benefit pension plans 
if they terminate (single-employer plans) or become insolvent 
(multiemployer plans);  
 authorizes the Labor Department and plan participants to 
enforce the minimum standards;  
                                                                                                                                      
36  Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (noting that a failure 
to bargain in good faith on the terms and condition of employment is an unfair labor 
practice).  29 U.S.C § 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
37  Welfare and Pensions Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 
(1958).  
38  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 1001(b) (“…the continued well-being and security of 
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee 
benefit] plans… [ERISA’s declared policy is to] protect interstate commerce and the 
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . .”).    
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 broadly preempts State law as it relates to employee benefit 
plans; and 
 opens the federal courts to benefit claims.39   
Like all legislation, however, ERISA represents a compromise.  In 
the first place, ERISA does not require an employer to have a plan.  Nor did 
Congress want to deter employers from establishing or continuing plans by 
making them too expensive.40  Thus, for instance, ERISA does not require 
immediate vesting. 41  Most important for our purpose, ERISA does not 
require that benefits be fully funded.  Rather, it allows a funding shortfall to 
be amortized over a period of years.42  
ERISA’s minimum standards are found in the Labor title of the U.S. 
Code (Title 29) as positive law.  Thus, for example, the vesting and anti-
cutback rules are enforceable in court.43  The minimum standards are also 
found in the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26), mainly as conditions of tax 
qualification.  To enjoy favorable tax treatment, an employer must (for 
example) ensure that its plan meets the vesting and anti-cutback 
                                                                                                                                      
39   29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25, 1052-55, 1082-85(a), 1102-11, 1114(a), 1132, 1301-
1453. 
40  See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 supra note 27, at 9 (“The Committee believes that 
the legislative approach of establishing minimum standards and safeguards for 
private pensions is not only consistent with retention of the freedom of decision-
making vital to pension plans, but in furtherance of the growth and development of 
the private pension system.”). 
41  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976) (permitting employers to use ten-year 
“cliff” vesting under defined benefit plans; an employee was not vested at all until 
after ten years of participation, and then became 100% vested) with 29 U.S.C. § 
1053(a) (2000) (mandating five-year cliff vesting).   
42  See infra p.16 (noting ERISA initially provided for a series of charges and 
credits to a “funding standard account,” each to be amortized over a period that in 
some cases was as long as 30 years.  Under current law, there is a single “shortfall,” 
generally amortized over seven years.) See James Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story 
of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins 
of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 700-01 (2001) (noting Pension plans generally 
begin life with a significant unfunded past service liability, as they usually grant 
credit for service with the employer before it established the plan.  Otherwise, at 
least in a unionized workplace, senior employees might prefer to forgo pensions in 
favor of larger paychecks.); Malcolm Gladwell, The Risk Pool, THE NEW YORKER 
(Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/08/28/the-risk-pool. 
43  E.g., Cent. Laborers Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004). 
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requirements.44   By Executive Order, President Carter allocated primary 
authority between the Department of Labor and the Department of 
Treasury/Internal Revenue Service.  Treasury/IRS has primary authority 
over the funding rules.45   
Because qualified plans are tax advantaged, Congress has 
historically used the qualification rules to promote broader pension coverage 
and other pension policy goals.  For example, the Tax Codeo  
nondiscrimination rules, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1942, are 
designed to ensure that rank-and-file workers get some of the benefits that 
top management does.46  But fiscal concerns have also led Congress to adjust 
the funding rules to reduce deductible contributions, so as to raise revenue 
or permit a spending bill to “erore” well.47   
C. PENSION INSURANCE UNDER ERISA 
The rallying cry for pension reform was the failure of the Studebaker 
Company.  The automaker was unable to compete with GM, Ford and 
Chrysler, and it was forced to liquidate in 1963.  Studebaker had a defined 
benefit plan with a formula similar to the ones at the Big Three.  As was 
                                                                                                                                      
44   26 U.S.C. § 4971 (2014) (noting the funding rules, however, are not 
conditions of tax qualification.  The IRS enforces funding by assessing excise taxes, 
10% of the annual shortfall, and 100% if the shortfall is not made up.); 26 U.S.C. § 
430(k) (2015) (noting PBGC also enforces the funding rules by perfecting and 
enforcing liens when contributions of more than $1 million are delinquent).   
45  Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, reprinted in 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (Oct. 
17, 1978); See Panel 3: Negotiating the Agency Peace Treaty: Reorganization Plan 
No. 4, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 319-39 (Spring 2014). (For a discussion of the 
administration of ERISA in its infancy). 
46 Another purpose of the nondiscrimination rules, though, was to prevent tax 
evasion by firms seeking to shelter executives’ compensation. The 1942 
nondiscrimination provision was “particularly anemic.” Not surprisingly, the main 
purpose of the bill was to “extract the maximum contribution from taxpayers . . . 
during the austere and expensive years of the Second World War.” See Madeline 
Sexton Lewis, The Legislative History of the Nondiscrimination Provision of 
Qualified Retirement Plans, 2014-7 N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS § 7.03 & 7.04 
(2015) (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2015). 
47  See Alan Cole, The Highway Bill "Pension Gimmick:" A Primer, The Tax 
Policy Blog (Jul 15, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/highway-bill-pension-
gimmick-primer; See generally, Lewis, supra note 30, at 1-12 (in the 1980s and early 
1990s, “retirement income policy took a back seat to revenue-driven exigencies of 
budget deficit politics,” and it was not until the economic boom of the mid-1990s 
that Congress would refocus on retirement income policy.) 
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common, the plan document provided that plan assets would first be 
allocated to the benefits of retirees.  Retirees’ benefits were fully funded, but 
4,000 vested employees between ages 40 and 60 got only 15% of what they 
were promised.  Two thousand nine hundred under age forty got nothing.48  
That squarely presented the problem of default risk.49 
Federal insurance became the solution.  Originally deemed 
“reinsurance,” pension insurance was the brainchild of the United Auto 
Workers.50  PBGC was largely modeled on the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. 51   Thus, for example, pension insurance is mandatory for 
covered plans.52  And there are limits that serve as a form of co-insurance.53    
PBGC guarantees benefits under single-employer plans and (since 
1980 amendments) multiemployer plans.54  The insurable event for a single-
                                                                                                                                      
48  Wooten, supra note 42, at 731. 
49  Id. 
50  Wooten, supra note 42, at 716-17. On reinsurance generally, see Marcus A. 
Mendoza, Reinsurance as Governance: Governmental Risk Management Pools as a 
Case Study in the Governance Role Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. 
INS. L. J. 53 (2014).  
51  120 CONG. REC. S29950 (daily ed. Aug, 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. 
Bentsen). 
52  29 U.S.C. § 1306(a), (c) (2016). 
53  Richard A. Ippolito, The Economics of Pension Insurance 21-24, 37-38 
(1989) (One might loosely analogize PBGC to financial guarantee, or monoline, 
insurance. Monoline insurers typically backstop municipal bonds or mortgage 
obligations). See J.M. Pimbley, Bond Insurers, 22 J. OF APPLIED FIN. 35 
(Spring/Summer 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2689888; Sebastian Schich, 
Challenges Related to Financial Guarantee Insurance, 2008 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 
81 (Jun. 2008) (State laws confine them to that line of business, hence the term 
“monoline.” Like a monoline insurer, PBGC insures against a third party’s default. 
And because the third-party obligations are homogeneous, the risk is not diversified. 
Telephone conversation with Christopher Anderson, Principal, Anderson Insights, 
Inc. (May 9, 2016). 
54   For single-employer plans, the maximum guaranteed amount is about 
$60,000 per year at age 65. For multiemployer plans, the guarantee is much lower. 
The maximum is a function of the participant’s service and the benefit accrual rate 
under the plan, e.g., about $13,000 per year with 30 years of service, $8,600 per year 
with 20 years of service, and so on. The guaranty of benefit increases is phased in 
over five years for single-employer plans, but benefit increases under multiemployer 
plans are not guaranteed at all if they are less than five-years old. Premiums for 
single-employer plans are $64 per participant per year, plus $30 per $1,000 of 
unfunded vested benefits, with scheduled increases to $80 and $41, respectively, by 
2019. For multiemployer plans, premiums are $27 per participant per year. The 
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employer plan is plan termination. 55   A plan sponsor can terminate an 
underfunded single-employer plan only if it demonstrates financial 
distress—liquidation in bankruptcy or inability to reorganize in bankruptcy 
or to continue in business unless it sheds its pension plan.  PBGC can initiate 
termination if a plan fails ERISA’s minimum funding standard, if it will be 
unable to pay benefits when due, or if PBGC’s long-run loss may increase 
unreasonably if the plan is not terminated (for instance, if the sale of a 
profitable subsidiary would lessen the employer’s ability to fund the plan).56   
On termination of an underfunded plan, PBGC becomes trustee, 
taking over the plan’s assets and its obligations.  When a plan terminates, the 
employer is liable to PBGC for the difference between the plan’s benefit 
liabilities and its assets.57  Employer liability is meant to keep plan sponsors 
from promising benefits they cannot afford, thereby shifting the financial 
burden to the insurance program and to other sponsors whose premiums 
support the program. 58   A PBGC regulation provides that liabilities are 
valued using surveys of closeout annuity prices.  The regulation uses a 
constant mortality factor, so the higher the surveyed price the lower the 
interest factor.59  The employer is also liable to the agency for any unpaid 
contributions, and for an exit fee known as a termination premium.60  PBGC 
has taken in more than 4,000 single-employer plans, and its single-employer 
insurance fund has a $24 billion deficit.61  
                                                                                                                                      
premium rates are indexed for inflation. 29 U.S.C §§ 1306, 1322, 1322A. PBGC is 
financed by premiums, assets of terminated plans, recovery on claims, and 
investment earnings. 2015 PBGC ANN. REP. 10, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2015-annual-report.pdf.   
55  29 U.S.C. § 1361 (2016). 
56  29 U.S.C. §§ 1341(c), 1342(a) (2016). ERISA makes all 80% commonly 
owned corporations or unincorporated businesses (a “controlled group”) jointly and 
severally liable for pension contributions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 412(b)(2), 414(b), (c), 26 
C.F.R. §§ 1.414(b)(1), 1.414(c)-1-(c)-5 (2016). The controlled group is also liable 
to PBGC for the obligations described in nn. 59, 62, and to multiemployer plans for 
those described in nn. 67-68, post. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(14), 1301(b)(1), 1362(a), 
29 C.F.R. § 4001.2 (2016). 
57  29 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(18), 1362(c) (2016). 
58  S. REP. NO 93-383, at 87 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4971. 
59  29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.41-.75 (2016); 70 Fed. Reg. 72,205 (Dec. 2, 2005) 
(codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 4044). 
60  29 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a)(7), 1362(b) (2016). 
61 2015 PBGC ANN REP., supra note 54, at 23. PBGC is not backed by the full 
faith and credit of the United States. See id. at 10. 
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Multiemployer plans can terminate, by mass withdrawal or by plan 
amendment.62  The insurable event, however, is insolvency, the inability to 
pay benefits in a given year. 63  PBGC doesn’t become trustee of 
multiemployer plans, but provides them with financial assistance to pay 
benefits at the guaranteed level.64 
Multiemployer plans spread the risk of business failure.  When an 
employer withdraws, by going non-union or ceasing business, it incurs 
withdrawal liability for its share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits.65  It 
pays that liability in installments designed to approximate its contributions 
at their highest point.66  Withdrawal liability is meant to slow the “vicious 
downward spiral” when employers start to abandon a troubled plan.  It does 
that by neutralizing incentives to withdraw, shoring up plans affected by 
withdrawals, and keeping faith with remaining employers.67  Nevertheless, 
PBGC provides financial assistance to more than 50 insolvent plans, and its 
multiemployer insurance fund has a $52 billion deficit.68    
D.  EXEMPTION OF PUBLIC PLANS FROM ERISA 
Congress exempted state and local plans from ERISA’s vesting, 
funding, and insurance regimes.  Congress had several reasons including:   
 public plans’ vesting provisions were then more generous than 
those of private plans;  
 “the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill their 
obligations to employees through their taxing powers was an 
adequate substitute for both minimum funding standards and 
plan termination insurance”69; and  
                                                                                                                                      
62  29 U.S.C. § 1341A (2016). 
63  29 U.S.C. § 1426 (2016).  
64  29 U.S.C. § 1322A, 1431 (2016).  
65  29 U.S.C. § 1381 (2016). 
66  29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1) (2016). 
67 On the characteristics of multiemployer plans and withdrawal liability, See 
Jayne E. Zanglein et al., Erisa Litigation 1393-95, 1407-13 (5th ed. 2014 and 2015 
Supp.). 
68  2015 PBGC ANN REP., supra note 54, at 3, 23. 
69 Rose v. Long Island R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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 “imposition of the minimum funding and other standards would 
entail unacceptable cost implications to governmental 
entities.”70   
Congress also did not want to intrude on areas of state concerns.  For 
example, the House Committee on Education and Labor report stated: 
There are literally thousands of public employee retirement 
systems operated by towns, counties, authorities and cities 
in addition to the state and Federal plans.  Eligibility, 
vesting, and funding provisions are at least as diverse as 
those in the private sector with the added uniqueness added 
by the legislative process.  For this reason the Committee is 
convinced that additional data and study is necessary before 
any attempt is made to address the issues of vesting and 
funding with respect to public plans.71   
On the other hand, some were concerned that public pensions were 
so generous that it was unlikely that adequate taxes would be allocated to 
them.  Congressman John Erlenborn of Illinois, for example, noted that 
lawsuits in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Illinois were seeking to compel funding 
in amounts that ranged from $18 million to $1.7 billion.72   
Congress commissioned a study to determine "the necessity for 
Federal legislation and standards with respect to such plans."73  In 1978, the 
House Committee on Education and Labor issued a Pension Task Force 
Report on Public Employee Retirement Systems.  The Report found that plan 
members, government officials, and the general public were kept in the dark 
about the true costs of public pensions, and that there was compelling need 
                                                                                                                                      
70 Id.  
71  Id.; See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Three years earlier, 
the Supreme Court had emphasized “Our Federalism,” a “system in which there is 
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.”); 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (The Court held that 
the Tenth Amendment prevents the national government from imposing minimum 
wages on local government employees based on the reach of the Commerce Clause); 
See generally Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 
(2012) (Federalism enjoyed another revival in the last decade). 
72  H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 43 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4667-
68. 
73  29 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (2016).    
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for uniform actuarial measures to assess their funding requirements.  The 
Report also found serious deficiencies in reporting and disclosure, and a need 
for fiduciary standards.74 
Bills were regularly introduced after ERISA was passed to establish 
minimum reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary standards for public plans.  
Initially dubbed “PERISA,” later versions were called “PEPPRA”—the 
Public Employee Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability Act—to reflect 
their more limited scope.75  No such bill was ever enacted.    
III. FEDERAL MINIMUM FUNDING STANDARDS   
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code set minimum funding 
standards for defined benefit plans.  The initial standards were a significant 
improvement on pre-ERISA law.  The standards were strengthened over two 
decades, including limits on actuarial discretion, shorter amortization 
periods, better enforcement tools, and stricter rules for poorly funded plans.  
More recently, some of the standards were relaxed.   
A.   SINGLE-EMPLOYER PLANS 
A plan sponsor must make an annual contribution.  To determine the 
annual contribution, the plan actuary will first calculate the “funding target,” 
or the present value of plan benefits at the beginning of the year.  From the 
funding target, she will subtract the value of plan assets, to derive the 
“shortfall.”  Next, she will set up a schedule to amortize the shortfall over 
seven years, netting out unamortized charges from prior years, to derive the 
“shortfall amortization charge.”  The actuary will also calculate “normal 
cost,” or the present value of benefits expected to be earned in the year plus 
an estimate of expenses in the year.76  Finally, the actuary will add the 
shortfall amortization charge and normal cost.  The sum is the year’s required 
contribution.   
                                                                                                                                      
74 COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB. 95th Cong., Pension Task Force Report on Public 
Employee Retirement Systems (Comm. Print 1987).  
75  Pub. Employee Pension Benefit Plans:  J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means & Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations 
of the Comm. on Educ.& Labor, 98th Cong., (Nov. 15, 1983) at 2. 
76  26 U.S.C. § 430(a)-(c). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1133-1135; Lynn A. Cook & James 
E. Holland, Jr., 371-6TH U.S. INCOME: EMPLOYEE PLANS—DEDUCTIONS, 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUNDING, TAX MGMT. PORT. at A-113-75 (2015). 
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As noted, the lower the interest assumption, the higher the present 
value, and thus the greater the potential shortfall.77  The interest assumption 
is based on an average of yields on high-quality corporate bonds, using a 
yield curve (or segments of the curve) to fit maturity to expected benefit 
payments.  Mortality is to be prescribed by the Treasury Department at least 
once every ten years.78  Mortality is currently based on the RP-2000 table 
(with improvements).79   
Contributions are generally due in quarterly installments, 15 days 
after the close of the quarter.  Any deficiency must be paid off in a “catch-
up payment” no later than 8-1/2 months after the close of the year.  For 
instance, contributions for the 2016 year are due April 15, July 15, and 
October 15, 2016, and January 15, 2017, with the catch-up payment due 
September 15, 2017.80   
A sponsor may elect to create a prefunding balance if it contributes 
more than the minimum required.  It may then apply the prefunding balance 
in lieu of cash contributions.81   
A sponsor experiencing temporary substantial business hardship 
may apply to IRS for a waiver of the year’s contribution.  The waived amount 
then becomes an additional amortization charge in the next five years.  IRS 
may require that security be given to the plan, enforceable by PBGC.82   
Poorly funded plans are subject to greater discipline.  A liquidity 
shortfall contribution is required to the extent a plan’s liquid assets do not 
equal three times its annual disbursements.83  Additional funding is required 
if a plan is “at risk,” less than 80% funded.  At-risk plans cannot increase 
benefits; they must assume that employees will retire as early as possible and 
take benefits in the most expensive form; and their funding is subject to a 
4% “load” or surcharge.  A pre-funding balance cannot be used instead of 
cash contributions if the plan is at risk.84    
Payment of shutdown benefits or other unpredictable contingent 
event benefits is prohibited to the extent a plan is less than 60% funded, as 
is payment of lump sums or purchase of annuities to the extent a plan is less 
than 60% funded (100% funded if the sponsor is in bankruptcy).  Benefit 
                                                                                                                                      
77  McGill, supra note 4, at 207-09.  
78  26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2), (3) (2016). 
79  Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A-122.   
80  26 U.S.C. § 430(j) (2016). 
81  26 U.S.C. § 430(f)(3) (2016).   
82  26 U.S.C §§ 412(c), 430(a)(1)(c), (e) (2016). 
83  26 U.S.C. § 430(j)(4) (2016). 
84  26 U.S.C § 430(i) (2016). 
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accruals must cease to the extent the plan remains less than 60% funded.  
Partial restrictions apply if the plan is between 60% and 80% funded.85 
If the annual contribution is not made by the catch-up date, an 
“accumulated funding deficiency” results, and an excise tax of 10% of the 
deficiency is imposed.  The tax increases to 100% if the deficiency is not 
timely corrected.86   
A plan fiduciary, a participant or beneficiary, or the Secretary of 
Labor can bring suit to enforce the minimum funding standards.87  Case law 
and Labor Department guidance require a fiduciary to pursue full collection 
unless it would result in hardship and reduced collection.88  
PBGC also enforces the minimum funding requirements.  If the 
unpaid balance exceeds one million dollars, a lien arises in favor of the plan 
on all property of the controlled group.  PBGC has sole authority to perfect 
and enforce this lien.89   
                                                                                                                                      
85  26 U.S.C. § 436 (2016). 
86  26 U.S.C. § 4971 (2012). 
87  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), (5) (2012). 
88  In McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986), the employer 
obtained a funding waiver based on the required showing of temporary substantial 
business hardship, and later filed bankruptcy and terminated the pension plan.  
Former employees sued plan fiduciaries for failing to seek contributions.  In 
affirming a grant of summary judgment for the fiduciaries, the court said, “whenever 
an employer seeks to avoid making its pension plan payments, whether pursuant to 
[a funding waiver] or in any other manner, trustees have a duty to investigate the 
relevant facts, to explore alternative courses of action and, if in the best interests of 
the plan participants, to bring suit against the employer.”  But “[i]t normally will be 
reasonable,” the court continued, “for plan fiduciaries to refrain from action which 
might send the employer into bankruptcy or lead to the termination of the plan.” Id. 
at 112. A fiduciary’s compromising a claim for delinquent contributions or giving 
extended payment terms would ordinarily be a prohibited transaction under 29 
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (2012). The Labor Department’s Prohibited Transaction 
Exemption 76-1 permits trustees of a multiemployer plan to do so only if they make 
“systematic, reasonable, and diligent efforts” to collect delinquent contributions and 
only if they can demonstrate that the arrangement in a given case is reasonable and 
likely to maximize the net collection.  Employee Benefit Plan, 41 Fed. Reg. 12,740 
(March 26, 1976). 
89  26 U.S.C. § 430(k) (2012).  The lien has the status of a federal tax lien.  Thus, 
for example, it may become senior to advances under a revolving credit arrangement 
after 45 days or notice to the lender, whichever occurs first. 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (2012), 
incorporated by reference in 26 U.S.C. § 430(k)(4)(C) (2012) and 29 U.S.C. § 
1368(c)(1) (2012).  
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B.  MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS  
Contributions are set by collective bargaining agreements, usually at 
an hourly rate.  The hourly rate is calibrated so that, when multiplied by an 
estimate of hours to be worked, contributions will meet the statutory 
minimum. 
The minimum is set by a “funding standard account,” to which 
specified charges and credits are made each year.  If the total charges to the 
funding standard account are greater than the total credits (including 
contributions), there is a funding deficiency.  In computing the charges and 
credits, the plan’s actuary must use assumptions that are individually 
reasonable and that in combination represent her best estimate of future 
experience.90   
A funding waiver can be granted if 10% of the employers would 
otherwise suffer substantial business hardship, with the waived amount 
amortized over 15 years.  A plan can also seek an extension of the 
amortization period from 15 to 20 years if it has adopted a funding 
improvement plan (see below), or to 25 years if necessary to avoid plan 
termination or a substantial benefit curtailment.91   
The trustees of a multiemployer plan can bring suit to collect unpaid 
contributions.  ERISA provides for a simple collection suit with virtually no 
defenses, and adds interest, liquidated damages, and attorney fees to the 
judgment.92 
Multiemployer plans in endangered or critical status (less than 80% 
or 65% funded, respectively) must also adopt funding improvement plans 
(FIP) or rehabilitation plans (RP).  An endangered or “yellow zone” plan’s 
FIP must project a one-third funding improvement over ten years.  The FIP 
typically contains a negotiated schedule of contribution increases and a 
                                                                                                                                      
90  26 U.S.C. § 431(a), (c)(3) (2012). 
91  26 U.S.C. §§ 412(c), 431(d) (2012). 
92  29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g)(2), 1145 (2012). A third-party beneficiary is ordinarily 
subject to the same defenses as the obligee, but, as a matter of federal labor law, 
union misconduct is no defense to a multiemployer plan’s collection suit.  Lewis v. 
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960).  By declaring that “[e]very employer who 
is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the 
plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not 
inconsistent with law, make such contributions,” 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (2012), Congress 
invalidated other defenses that make the contract merely voidable and not void.  An 
example is fraud in the inducement, as distinct from fraud in factum.  Sw. Adm’rs, 
Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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default schedule if no agreement is reached.  The default schedule typically 
requires decreases in benefit accruals as well.93   
A critical or “red zone” plan’s RP must project emergence from the 
red zone in ten years.  Red zone plans generally may suspend early retirement 
subsidies and other ancillary benefits not in pay status and restrict lump 
sums, in addition to reducing future accruals.  If emergence is not possible, 
a red zone plan must at least take reasonable measures to forestall 
insolvency.94 
Under the Multiemployer Plan Reform Act of 2014,95 there is a new 
category, “critical and declining.”  A plan that is projected to be insolvent 
within 20 years (fifteen years if its ratio of inactive to active participants is 
less than two to one) may permanently reduce benefits, even those in pay 
status, except for people who are older than 80 or are disabled.  The 
reductions must be approved by the Treasury Department, in consultation 
with the Labor Department and PBGC, and the plan may not reduce benefits 
below 110% of the PBGC guaranteed level.96  MPRA also authorizes PBGC 
to partition such a plan to reduce its own expected loss and maintain plan 
solvency.  In that event, the partitioned plan pays guaranteed benefits from 
PBGC financial assistance.97    
 
                                                                                                                                      
93  26 U.S.C. § 432(c) (2012). 
94  26 U.S.C. § 432(e) (2012).  
95 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, 128 Stat. 2130, 2773-822 (2014). 
96  26 U.S.C. § 432(b) & (e) (2014).  In the first major test of these rules, Central 
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan, the Treasury Department 
denied a benefit reduction application, finding that earnings and entry-age 
assumptions were not reasonable, and that the proposed reductions were not 
reasonably estimated to prevent insolvency. Letter from Kenneth R. Feinberg, 
Special Master, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Gary Ford, Esq., Principal, Groom Law 
Group, Thomas C. Nyhan, Exe. Director & the Bd. of Trs., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. 
Areas Pension Plan (May 6, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/services/Responses2/Central%20States%20Notification
%20Letter.pdf. 
97  29 U.S.C. § 1413 (2012).  In Road Carriers Local 707 Pension Plan, PBGC 
denied a partition application, finding that employment and contribution projections 
were unduly optimistic, and that there was insufficient evidence to reasonably expect 
that the Plan would remain solvent following partition.  Letter from PBGC to Kevin 
McCaffrey, Interim Fund Manager & Bd. of Trs., Road Carriers Local 707 Welfare 
& Pension Funds (June 2016), http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/PBGC-Letter-June-
2016.pdf. 
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C.  HISTORY OF ERISA’S FUNDING RULES 
1.  ERISA’s Reforms 
Before ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code required that an employer 
contribute only normal cost plus interest on unfunded accrued liability.98  
Thus, the unfunded liability might never be amortized.  It was a recognized 
“best practice” to amortize past service liability over 30 years, but even that 
did not prevent the Studebaker disaster.99   
The ERISA rules were a considerable improvement.  ERISA 
required plans to maintain a funding standard account, to which charges and 
credits were added each year.  Among those charges were amortization of 
past service liability (generally over 30 years), losses from change in 
actuarial assumptions (20 years), and experience losses (15 years).  For 
multiemployer plans, losses from both changes in assumptions and 
experience were amortized over 15 years.  Credits included gains from 
changes in assumptions or experience, and they were similarly amortized.100 
If the sum of charges and credits was a net charge, or “accumulated 
funding deficiency,” there was a contribution due that year.  Conversely, if 
there was a “credit balance,” it could be used in future years in lieu of cash 
contributions.101 
Contributions were subject to the full funding limit, generally the 
difference between the present value of accrued benefits projected for salary 
increases and the lesser of market or actuarial value of assets.  They were 
also subject to the deductible limit, which involved a more complex 
calculation, but was capped at the full funding limit.102   
There were six approved funding methods.103  A funding method 
identifies gains and losses each year and amortizes them (as in the unit credit 
method), or spreads gains and losses by rolling them into normal cost (as in 
the frozen initial liability method).  The methods differ in how much they 
backload funding costs.104 
                                                                                                                                      
98  Steven Sass, ERISA’S Treatment of Default and Forfeiture Risk in Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans: Reflections From ERISA at 40: What Were They Thinking?, 
6 DREXEL L. REV. 495, 496 (2014). 
99  Id. at 496-97. 
100  26 U.S.C. § 412(b) (1976). 
101  26 U.S.C. § 412(a) (2012). 
102  26 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(1), 412(c)(6) (2014). 
103  26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012). 
104  McGill, supra note 4, at 647-51; SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, WHICH PENSION 
FUNDING METHOD IS RIGHT FOR YOU? 21-23 (No. 1, Session 54PD (Vol. 23 1997)), 
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Assumptions and methods had to be reasonable in the aggregate and 
represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience.105  This gave 
the actuary considerable discretion.  For example, conservative assumptions 
could be offset by anti-conservative ones, and asset values could be 
“smoothed” (gains and losses averaged) over five years, to dampen 
volatility.106  The legislative history made clear that these choices were for 
the actuary, and that the actuary was to exercise independent judgment.107   
                                                                                                                                      
https://www.soa.org/Library/Proceedings/Record-Of-The-Society-Of-
Actuaries/1990-99/1997/January/rsa97v23n154pd.aspx. 
105  26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2012). 
106  26 C.F.R. § 1.412(c)(2)-1(b) (2016).  In some cases, the IRS challenged 
assumptions on grounds that they were overly conservative and led to improperly 
large deductions for contributions.  The courts generally deferred to the actuaries’ 
judgments, emphasizing that assumptions needed only to be reasonable in the 
aggregate, not individually.  Rhoades, McKee & Boer v. United States, 43 F.3d 1071 
(6th Cir. 1995); Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz v. Comm'r, 26 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 
1994); Vinson & Elkins v. Comm'r, 7 F.3d 1235 (5th Cir. 1993).    
107  ERISA “requires that, for purposes of the minimum funding standard, all 
plan costs, liabilities, rates of interest, and other factors under the plan are to be 
determined on the basis of actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the 
aggregate, are reasonable.  Actuarial assumptions are to take into account the 
experience of the plan and reasonable expectations.  These assumptions are expected 
to take into consideration past experience as well as other relevant factors.  In 
addition . . . the actuarial assumptions in combination are to offer the actuary's best 
estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.”  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 284-
85 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5065. Moreover, actuarial 
assumptions must be "independently determined by an actuary."  It would be 
"inappropriate for an employer to substitute his judgment for that of a qualified 
actuary,” and “if such a circumstance were to arise an actuary would have to refuse 
giving his favorable opinion . . . ."  S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 70 (1973), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4955. Congress initially rejected any attempt to 
standardize assumptions.  The House Ways and Means Committee stated, “[T]he 
proper actuarial assumptions may differ substantially between industries, among 
firms, geographically, and over time.  Further…each actuarial assumption may be 
reasonable over a significant range and it would appear that the proper test would be 
whether all actuarial assumptions used together are reasonable. These considerations 
strongly indicate that any attempt to specify actuarial assumptions and funding 
methods for pension plans would in effect place these plans in a straitjacket…, and 
would be likely to result in cost estimates that are not reasonable.”  H.R. Rep. No. 
93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4694. Though suits against 
pension actuaries are subject to defenses, actuarial malpractice is actionable.  See, 
e.g., Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding actuarial 
malpractice claim under state law is not preempted by ERISA). 
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2. Amendments to the Minimum Funding Standards and 
the Need for Further Reform   
For single-employer plans, the funding rules have been amended 
many times.  For the first few decades after ERISA’s enactment, the rules 
were mainly strengthened.  For example, Congress adopted a deficit 
reduction contribution in 1987.  A sponsor whose plan was less than 90% 
funded using prescribed assumptions (GAM-83 mortality and up to 105% of 
the four-year average of 30-year Treasury yields) had to contribute an 
additional amount to eliminate the deficit within three to seven years.108  In 
the mid-2000s, however, Congress exempted plans in the airline and steel 
industries from the deficit reduction contribution for a number of years, and 
allowed them to use a higher interest rate to compute their contributions.109  
The 1987 amendments also introduced the quarterly contributions 
and the lien, and joint and several liability among controlled group 
members. 110   The 1994 amendments prohibited benefit increases during 
bankruptcy by poorly funded plans.111  
Nevertheless, critics pointed out continuing weaknesses in ERISA’s 
funding standards, either standing alone or when combined with regulatory 
gaps in other areas.  For example, PBGC Executive Director Steven 
Kandarian testified before Congress in 2003 that: 
 funding targets are the result of legislative compromise rather than 
an objective measure of full funding, don’t recognize that business 
reverses often result in subsidized early retirements, and don’t 
recognize the cost of annuitization;  
 credit balances permit funding holidays, despite possible investment 
losses in the interim; 
 funding rules do not take employer credit risk into account; 
                                                                                                                                      
108  Pension Protection Act of 1987, Title IX, Subtitle D of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203 § 9303, 101 Stat. 1330-333-343 
(1987), (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 412(l) (1988)). 
109  Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, §102, 118 Stat. 
596, 599-602 (Apr. 10, 2004), codified as 26 U.S.C. § 412 (l)(12) (2006). 
110  101 Stat. 1330-344-347, 1330-348-50, 1330-352-53 (codified as 26 U.S.C 
§§ 412(b)(2), 430(c)(11), (j), (k)). 
111  Retirement Protection Act of 1994, Title VII, Subtitle F of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 766, 108 Stat. 4809, 5036-37 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(33) (2006)). 
168 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
 the full funding limit and maximum deductible limit do not allow 
plans to build up an adequate surplus for bad times;  
 funding rules do not take account of lump sum elections;  
 funding is too volatile, in part because smoothing rules don’t work 
as well as they should.112   
Kandarian cited the example of Bethlehem Steel, whose plan 
terminated with a $3.9 billion shortfall.  Due to credit balances, Bethlehem 
made no contributions for the three years leading up to plan termination.   
Kandarian also noted that pension liabilities are correlated with bond 
yields but not equity returns.  Equity investments therefore result in greater 
volatility, and tend to shift risk from employers and employees to the 
insurance system.113   
David Walker, the U.S. Comptroller General, and Barbara Bovbjerg, 
the Government Accountability Office’s Director of Education, Workforce 
and Income Security Issues, echoed some of these observations.  They also 
noted that Bethlehem’s plan was heavily invested in equities, leading to 
significant losses in the run-up to plan termination in 2003, and that 
Polaroid’s plan was severely underfunded at termination partly because 
contributions had been capped by the deductible limit.114 
                                                                                                                                      
112  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, H.R. (2003) 
(Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation), http://archives.republicans.edlabor.house.gov/archive/ 
hearings/108th/fc/pbgc090403/kandarian.htm. 
113  Under ERISA’s fiduciary standards, no investment is per se prudent or 
imprudent.  Under a Labor Department “safe harbor,” an investment is prudent if a 
fiduciary has “given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that, 
given the scope of such fiduciary's investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should 
know are relevant to the particular investment,” and has “acted accordingly.”  
“Appropriate consideration” includes whether the investment is “reasonably 
designed . . . to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of 
loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return),” “the composition of the portfolio 
with regard to diversification,” “liquidity and current return . . . relative to . . . 
anticipated cash-flow requirements . . .,” and “projected return  . . . relative to the 
funding objectives of the plan.”  29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2015). 
114   U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-873T, PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORPORATION: SINGLE-EMPLOYER PENSION INSURANCE PROGRAM 
FACES SIGNIFICANT LONG-TERM RISKS: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON 
EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, H.R. (2003), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/120/110278.pdf.; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-176T, 
PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGING FUNDING RULES AND ENHANCING INCENTIVES CAN 
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David Wilcox, Deputy Director of the Federal Reserve, noted that 
weak restrictions on lump sums and early retirement benefits could lead to 
significant deterioration of plan funding.  He added that the funding 
standards did not permit, let alone require, pre-funding of shutdown benefits 
or other unpredictable contingent event benefits.115 
3. PPA and Beyond 
The 2006 Pension Protection Act made a major overhaul, removing 
virtually all remaining actuarial discretion in the case of single-employer 
plans, and imposing strict rules to shore up the defined benefit system.116  For 
single-employer plans, there is no longer a set of charges and credits, to be 
amortized over various periods.  Rather, each year, the shortfall is reckoned, 
the unamortized portions of prior year shortfalls are netted, and the yearly 
contribution is computed based on seven-year amortization, plus normal 
cost.   
The assumptions were constrained, as noted, to the corporate-bond 
yield curve and mortality factors prescribed by the Treasury Department.  
Asset values could be smoothed over no more than two years, and the result 
had to be within a 90-100% corridor of fair market value.  A single actuarial 
method (the unit benefit method) was required.  The special funding rules 
and benefit restrictions were adopted for “at-risk” plans. 117   And the 
deductible limit was increased to normal cost plus 150% of the funding 
target, less assets.118   
                                                                                                                                      
IMPROVE PLAN FUNDING: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMM. ON EDUC. & THE 
WORKFORCE, H.R. (2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110468.pdf. 
115   David W. Wilcox, Reforming the Defined-Benefit Pension System, 
BROOKINGS, 235 (2016), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/projects/bpea/spring-
2006/2006a_bpea_wilcox.pdf. 
116  The pre-PPA rules are summarized in Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A-
141-75, and in STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION 
PLANS AND THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION (Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.jct.gov/x-3-05.pdf.  The PPA changes are summarized in PATRICK 
PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33703: SUMMARY OF THE PENSION 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 (2006), https://www.worldatwork.org/ 
waw/adimLink?id=15322. 
117  Pension Protection Act of 2006 §§ 112, 113, 120 Stat. at 839-42, 847-51. 
118  Cook & Holland, supra note 75, at A-113-40. 
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While multiemployer plan actuaries retained discretion on funding 
methods and assumptions, the amortization period for post-PPA experience 
was shortened to fifteen years.119  
But the new rules largely took effect just as the Great Recession 
began.  So Congress adopted relief provisions.120  For single-employer plans, 
they included allowing the smoothing of asset values for the bleak years 2008 
and 2009, the averaging of interest rates over a 25-year look-back period, 
and, in lieu of the standard seven-year amortization schedule, an election of 
interest-only payments for two years followed by seven-year amortization 
(“2 and 7”) or fifteen-year amortization.  For multiemployer plans, they 
included allowing 30-year amortization of investment losses that occurred in 
2008 or 2009, and ten-year averaging of those losses for asset-valuation 
purposes.121   
These provisions gave sponsors more flexibility, but traded off 
PPA’s goal of shoring up the system as a whole.  By 2013, the ERISA 
agencies were reporting that, despite improvements, many multiemployer 
plans could still fail.  In 2014, the Congressional Research Service reported 
that the PBGC multiemployer insurance system itself was at risk of failing 
within a decade or so.122   MPRA followed, as part of the “Cromnibus” 
spending bill at the end of 2014.   
Funding legislation is often enacted as part of a larger package.  For 
example, the 1987 amendments were part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, and the 1994 amendments were part of the General 
                                                                                                                                      
119   Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 201, 120 Stat 780, 
858-68 (2006), codified as 26 U.S.C § 431(b). 
120   PPA itself provided relief to airlines, allowing them to use pre-PPA funding 
rules with generous interest assumptions and seventeen-year amortization.  Pub. L. 
No. 109-208, § 402(e)(2), 120 Stat. 780, (codified at 925-28, 26 U.S.C. § 430 note 
(2012)). 
121   Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension 
Relief Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-192, §§ 201-02, 211, 124 Stat. 1280, 1283-85, 
1290-93, 1297-99, 1302-06 (2010); Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 40211, 126 Stat. 405, 846-50 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 
404 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2012)).  
122   U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORP., MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS: REPORT TO CONGRESS 
REQUIRED BY THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, 113TH CONG. (2013), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pbgc-report-multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf; 
JOHN J. TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43305, MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED 
BENEFIT (DB) PENSION PLANS: A PRIMER AND ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS 
(2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43305.pdf 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  But, that leaves the pension changes open 
to revenue-scoring objectives.  For example, recent rounds of legislation that 
provided funding relief—as well as PBGC premium increases--helped to 
raise federal revenue estimates as part of federal budget legislation and to 
keep the Highway Trust Fund afloat. 123  Two bills have recently been 
introduced to prevent use of PBGC premium increases this way: one would 
take PBGC off-budget, and the other would prohibit use of PBGC premium 
increases as an offset to pay for other federal spending.124   
IV. REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AND OTHER CONTROLS 
Disclosure to plan participants, investors, and, for pooled funds, to 
employers and their stakeholders, can influence funding.125  Both single-
employer and multiemployer plans must file an Annual Report (Form 5500) 
with the ERISA agencies.  A defined benefit plan’s Annual Report must 
include:  
 statements of assets and liabilities and changes in net assets available 
for benefits (including revenue and expenses);   
 schedules of investment assets and related-party transactions, among 
others; 
 footnote disclosures on significant plan amendments and their 
impact on benefits and on the plan’s funding policy and any changes 
to it;  
 a certified public accountant’s opinion that the financial statements 
are presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles; and  
                                                                                                                                      
123  Title V of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, §§ 501-
04, 129 Stat. 591-594 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i)(VI) - (VIII), (G), 
(a)(8)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 1307(a); 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2)(C)(iv)(II)); Title II of the 
Highway and Transportation Funding Act (“HATFA”) of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-
159, § 2003, 128 Stat. 1839, 1849-51 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2)(B) & (C)(iv) 
(2012)); see PBGC, TECH. UPDATE 14-1: EFFECT OF HATFA ON PBGC PREMIUMS 
(2014), http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/other-guidance/tu/tu14-1.html.   
124  Pension and Budget Integrity Act of 2016, H. R. 4955, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(would take PBGC off-budget); Pension and Budget Integrity Act of 2016, S. 3240, 
114th Cong. (2016) (would prohibit use of PBGC premium increases as an offset for 
other federal spending).   
125  Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, at 1347-49; Shnitser, supra note 1, at 
688-91.   
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 an enrolled actuary’s statement of  the required contributions, 
including the normal cost, funding target, and asset values; current-
year and unreported prior-year-contributions; the methods and 
assumptions and any changes to them; and a statement that the report 
is complete and accurate and the assumptions are reasonable.126  
Under PPA, a plan with a funding shortfall must provide participants 
and beneficiaries with an annual funding notice (“AFN”).  The AFN must 
disclose: 
 the amount of the shortfall;  
 that the shortfall is based on a 25-year average of interest rates;  
 what it would be using a two-year average;  
 the funding target attainment percentage;  
 the minimum funding contributions for the past three years; and 
 the limits of PBGC’s guaranty.127   
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 requires a 
public company to record its net periodic pension expense on its financial 
statements.  Net periodic pension expense is a spreading of the total cost of 
the plan over the plan’s lifetime, using a prescribed method.  For more than 
a decade, FAS 158 (and now Accounting Standard Codification 715) has 
also required a company to record the shortfall or surplus on the balance 
sheet, on both an Accumulated Benefit Obligation (current service and 
salary) and a Projected Benefit Obligation (current service and projected 
salary) basis.128   
For that purpose, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”) requires that the interest assumption reflect closeout costs, e.g., 
using rates on high-quality corporate bonds with maturities consistent with 
                                                                                                                                      
126  29 U.S.C. §§1023(a), (b), (d). 
127  29 U.S.C. § 1021(f) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-4(a). 
128 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., CONCEPT STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 87 5 (1985); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
CONCEPT STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 132 6 (1998).  
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expected payouts.129  Annual surveys by consulting firms reflect the range of 
mainstream assumptions.130   
As of 2011, FASB also requires a company participating in a 
multiemployer plan to disclose information about the plan’s zone status, 
among other things.  The company need not disclose potential withdrawal 
liability, except (under rules on accounting for contingencies) when 
withdrawal is probable or reasonably possible.131   
The annuity marketplace provides a useful benchmark.  Insurers 
regularly bid on pension plan closeout annuity contracts.  PBGC’s regulatory 
method for valuing benefit liabilities is based on this market.  PBGC has 
historically based its valuation assumptions on annuity prices, ascertained 
from double-blind surveys of annuity issuers.  Financial economists 
generally support using risk-free rates to value pension liabilities, which 
generally provides similar results.132   
                                                                                                                                      
129 News Release: FASB Improves Employer Disclosures for Multiemployer 
Pension Plans, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (Jul. 27, 2011) 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsP
age&cid=1176158794021 (noting the pooling effect of state “cost-sharing multiple-
employer” plans, akin to private-sector multiemployer plans, can obscure an 
individual employer’s obligations and shield them from the scrutiny of lenders and 
other stakeholders); Shnitser, supra note 1, at 689-91. 
130  E.g., KEN STOLER, KEVIN HASSAN & DEBBIE RUDIN, PENSION/OPEB 2014 
ASSUMPTION AND DISCLOSURE SURVEY (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014).  
131  Media Advisory 09/21/11: FASB Issues Accounting Standards Update to 
Improve Employer Disclosures for Multiemployer Pension Plans, FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer? 
pagename=FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=1176158943432; see Shnitser, 
supra note 1, at 705 (noting that the contribution of the ARC has been considered a 
measure of funding discipline); KEITH BRAINARD & ALEX BROWN, SPOTLIGHT ON 
THE ANNUAL REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE OF STATE RETIREMENT PLANS, 
FY 01- TO FY 13 9 (NAT’L ASS’N. OF ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., 2015). 
132  Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, 1324; In re US Airways Group, 303 
B.R. 784, 795-96 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating “The real issue is one of risk.  Annuity 
issuers base their pricing on returns offered by low-risk investments (typically high-
quality corporate bonds). Those returns are lower than the returns that might be 
achieved by investing in the stock market. The stock market, however, is highly 
volatile and far from certain . . .  [N]o one can predict with certainty what returns 
the stock market will produce over the next 50 years.  Given the strong societal 
interest in protecting pension benefits, a risk-free or nearly risk-free rate to value the 
pension liability is more appropriate than a rate based on optimistic projections (even 
if those projections are widely-shared by fund managers) as to the stock market's 
future long-term performance.”). 
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Actuarial independence and licensure are important controls. 133  
Under ERISA, an enrolled actuary (one licensed by a federal board, the Joint 
Board for Enrollment of Actuaries, or “JBEA”) must certify the required 
contribution.  The JBEA can suspend or terminate an actuary’s enrollment 
for misfeasance.134  More generally, actuaries are subject to a uniform Code 
of Conduct, whose main Precept reads, “An Actuary shall act honestly, with 
integrity and competence, and in a manner to fulfill the profession’s 
responsibility to the public and to uphold the reputation of the actuarial 
profession.”  The Code also requires adherence to Actuarial Standards of 
Practice (“ASOP”). 135   ASOP 4, Measuring Pension Obligations, and 
Determining Pension Plan Costs or Contributions, is the principal standard 
in this area.136 
V. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE 
EXPERIENCE UNDER ERISA?  
Like PBGC-insured plans, public plans involve risks to workers and 
retirees and uncertainties for sponsors and their stakeholders.  Based on the 
private-sector experience, reformers might propose that state lawmakers:   
A. Adopt responsible funding rules, and avoid the cycle of 
tightening and relaxing them.  The history of ERISA’s funding rules 
suggests that funding rules should be strong but should have enough 
flexibility to obviate temporary relief measures.  That observation 
seems fully applicable to the public sector. 
                                                                                                                                      
133   Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 1, at 1349-52, 1361 (noting not all state 
laws require actuarially based contributions.  Of those that do, not all require that 
assumptions be reasonable).   
134  29 U.S.C. §§ 1241, 1242 (2011).  
135  AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT  2 (2001). 
136ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BD., ACTUARIAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE NO. 4: 
MEASURING PENSION OBLIGATIONS AND DETERMINING PENSION PLAN COSTS OR 
CONTRIBUTIONS (Dec. 2013), http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/asop004_173-3.pdf; see, e.g., Press Release, Society of 
Actuaries, Society of Actuaries Response to Actuarial Standards Bd. Request for 
Comments-ASOPS & Pub. Pension Plan Funding & Accounting (Oct. 30, 2014), 
https://www.soa.org/News-and-Publications/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Society-of-
Actuaries-Response-to-Actuarial-Standards-Board-Request-for-Comments-
%E2%80%93-ASOPs-and-Public-Pension-Plan-Funding-and-Accounting.aspx. 
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B. Require actuarial independence.  ERISA’s emphasis on actuarial 
independence removes discretion from the employer.  Because 
public plans are inherently political, this could be a useful 
complement to other governance reforms suggested by the literature.        
C. Require conservative actuarial assumptions.  Under ERISA, 
actuarial discretion has become more and more constrained at least 
for single-employer plans.  But even a facially sound assumption can 
be weakened by a gimmick, like the 25-year lookback on corporate 
bond yields.  Given the dynamics of budget politics, it would be hard 
to put gimmicks off-limits, but model legislation could help to define 
best practices.         
D. Provide self-executing enforcement tools.  The ERISA funding 
lien requires only perfection to have the status of a federal tax lien.  
It may then become senior to a revolving credit arrangement, which 
tends to bring the parties to the table.  That remedy would almost 
certainly not apply in the public sector, due to sovereign immunity 
and concerns about holding municipal services hostage.  But for 
local plans, withholding of state revenue-sharing funds seems an 
even more effective way of ensuring that pension contributions are 
made.           
E. Make funding status and its implications transparent to 
stakeholders.  ERISA’s reporting and disclosure regime is a robust 
model, and its Annual Funding Notice highlights the relationship 
between poor funding and potential loss of benefits.  Accounting 
standards have advanced in both the private and public sectors.  They 
may generate pressure for funding discipline by lenders and other 
stakeholders.  Disclosure of the ARC/ADC would promote that 
objective.                
F. Encourage pre-funding to provide a reserve against lean times.  
The experience with the Tax Code’s full funding and deductible 
limits illustrates the tension between revenue and social objectives, 
and the effect on plans of weak employers.  Income tax treatment is 
not relevant for public plans, but, as shown by events in Illinois and 
New Jersey, pension funding always competes with other budget 
imperatives.    
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G. Invest with an eye to funding level, risk, and demographics.  
Public plan investing and risk management strategies are beyond the 
scope of this article, though they also have a significant effect on 
plan funding.  ERISA has no per se investment constraints.  The core 
guidance emphasizes the need to consider risk, return, and cash-flow 
objectives, which logically requires an understanding of the plan’s 
funding level, risk tolerance, and plan population.   
H. Guard against undue cross-subsidies.  ERISA’s withdrawal 
liability helped to hold multiemployer plans together for three 
decades, ameliorating the shift of legacy costs from some employers 
to others.  Though some multiemployer plans now are severely 
distressed, the situation surely would have been worse if there had 
been no cost for withdrawal.  Many state systems are multiple-
employer arrangements. As illustrated by the Stockton case, 
statutory and contractual withdrawal fees may help to keep 
employers in the fold.   
I. Guard against extraordinary payouts.  The ERISA experience 
with lump sums and contingent event benefits demonstrates the risk, 
at least for plans that are poorly funded or whose employers are 
declining.  If these benefits are triggered by workforce reductions, 
the plan may be less sustainable.   
J. Set a balance between funding and benefit promises.  The PPA 
regime for troubled multiemployer plans includes reductions of 
future accruals, and MPRA introduced reductions of accrued 
benefits for the most troubled.  Neither is possible under most state 
constitutions, except for local plans in a bankruptcy context.  Rather, 
as the Illinois Supreme Court held, a constitutional protection of 
pensions may imply a taxpayer guaranty. This suggests the 
importance of setting a balance between benefit promises and 
expected funding.          
